lighted two instances of quantifiable irregularities, in Molo and Kieni. In each constituency, there was a more than 20,000 vote discrepancy between the local count and the figures the ECK in Nairobi used. As it also pointed out, this alone would not be enough to change the overall result, but there were numerous other incidences of significant irregularities. EU EOM observers had been turned away from several of Kibaki’s Party for National Unity (PNU) constituencies and, at times, also been refused access to the ECK in Nairobi, despite Kivuitu’s explicit authorisation. Other irregularities included exceptionally strong voter turnout in several constituencies and a large discrepancy between presidential and parliamentary ballots being submitted. In conclusion, they felt that the parliamentary elections probably largely reflected the will of the electorate, but could not say the same for the presidential elections. However, one does not even have to look to foreign observers for criticism: Just days after announcing Kibaki’s win, Kivuiti revealed to the media that he only announced that result under intense pressure, that there had been irregularities – and that he did not, in fact, know whether Kibaki had actually been elected president. Several ECK officials have followed suit. Most recently, Kivuitu also went on record to say that a good deal of the overdue official ECK tallies, bearing his name and published in national newspapers, had not, in fact, been authorised by him. In the days after the elections, other groups, including election observers from the East African Community (EAC), have spoken out with the same criticisms. None of this appears to have mattered to Kibaki and his allies. Could the extent of the crisis have been anticipated? The short answer is no. Most Kenya analysts had been upbeat about Kenya’s prospects after a marked recovery in GDP growth from the stagnation and recession in the last years of the Moi administration. In addition, in 2005, when the government lost a referendum on the constitution, after a vibrant campaign by both supporters and opponents, President Kibaki had gracefully accepted this defeat. For many, the conduct of the referendum had not merely cast judgement on the constitutional draft but also functioned as a trial run for the 2007 elections. In fact, the referendum campaigns structured Kenya’s political landscape anew. With comparatively short experience in multi-party politics, Kenya has a profusion of registered parties, many just briefcase outfits. KANU, once the only kid on the block in the one party state under former president Moi, lost much of its significance when the democratic

space opened up. Opportunistic party-hopping was common. The successful ‘No’ or ‘orange’ faction, named after its referendum symbol, then coalesced around Raila Odinga and a few high-profile politicians as the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). In the 2007 election campaigns, Kibaki’s PNU focused on Kenya’s accelerating GDP growth rates. Odinga, in contrast, seized the sentiments of a large part of the population who felt they had been left out of this boom. Access to resources and opportunities became a volatile mix with ethnicity, age and other factors (see box), pitting the haves against the have-nots. Thus all the signs seemed to suggest a vigorous, close fought election even if the momentum

Economy – damage and perceptions Both Amos Kimunya, the minister of finance who had his mandate renewed, and Central Bank of Kenya governor, Njuguna Ndung’u, were confident that GDP growth forecasts would not be fundamentally challenged. (See story on page 22) This statement may have been in line with the overall policy of Kibaki’s administration to deny that there is a true crisis in the first place, but evidence belies it. If there is a reasonably quick settlement of the crisis, some key sectors of the economy, such as telecommunications, construction and transport, should indeed recover quickly. In agriculture, the picture is mixed: The commercial horticultural farms in Naivasha, in the Rift Valley, have experienced few to no

Opposite left: President Mwai Kibaki’s policy in the post-election upheavals following his ‘victory’ was to deny there was any real crisis. Above: By offering the economically excluded a voice, Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement attracted a groundswell of support that he claims won him the election.

seemed to be swinging towards Odinga. Most voters and, so it seemed, politicians gave the impression that they would abide by the choice of the majority. But, if the referendum had been seen as a precedent, it was a misleading one – there was far more at stake in the elections. In mid-January, while international mediators, including AU chairman and president of Ghana, John Kufuor, and former UN secretarygeneral, Kofi Annan were trying to broker some accommodation between Kibaki and Odinga, government officials were putting forward an upbeat image of Kenya’s economy.

disruptions, whereas commercial farmers in, for example, Kericho have faced more significant transport problems and destruction. Grain production, in particular, has taken a hit and as most of this is consumed locally, the fallout of the crisis is likely to include food shortages. The financial sector will struggle with a combination of adverse factors, only one of which is election related: non-performing loans are likely to increase not only as a direct fall-out of the violence but also from poor agricultural performance and from those who had sought and lost political office.

African Business | February 2008 17