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forum 46

poverty & the duty of assistance

TP M

4th quarter 2006

Is poverty our problem?

Alex Voorhoeve introduces our forum on global poverty and the duty of assistance

Shortly after the appearance of his early masterpiece Political Argument in the late 1960s, Brian Barry was asked why, in a book which discussed a wide range of questions facing contemporary society, from the justifi cation of the state’s coercive power to the fair distribution of income, he did not discuss the major moral issue of the day, namely, whether the use of nuclear weapons in all-out war could ever be justifi ed. Barry responded “when the moral facts are obvious, there is no need for philosophy.” The moral facts about global poverty may seem equally beyond dispute. Most inhabitants of rich nations encounter the moral issues that stem from global poverty in two ways. First, if we regard as even roughly accurate the estimates of aid agencies of the cost of permanently alleviating or preventing one individual’s poverty-related suffering, then we recognise that each of us is in a position to be able to meet the grave needs of distant strangers at moderate personal cost. Second, we recognise that by partaking

Alex Voorhoeve lectures in philosophy at the London School of Economics

in the ordinary life of our societies, we are participants in a global political and economic system with a decidedly mixed record on poverty alleviation. In recent decades, this system has generated the knowledge, wealth and economic opportunities that have played a central role in lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. At the same time, it has left unfulfi lled the basic needs of those with insuffi cient purchasing power, has maintained conditions conducive to the exploitation and oppression of many, and has led to serious environmental degradation. In both cases morality’s demands on us appear to be straightforward. Insofar as each one of us in a position through acts of benefi cence to significantly alleviate suffering without having to sacrifi ce anything of comparable moral importance, each of us should do so. Furthermore, in our daily roles as consumers and producers, each of us should ensure that he or she does not become party – however indirectly and unintentionally – to oppression or exploitation. Nor should we participate in transactions that generate unreasonable risks of harm to others. Finally, as citizens, we should support improvements in the global political and economic system. All this seems obvious. There may be a place for drawing people’s attention to the relevant facts, and for sermonising if people don’t act as they know they should, but, following Barry’s dictum, there seems to be no need for moral philosophy. On closer inspection, however, a host of questions surround these three moral duties, which I will refer to as the duty to aid, the duty not to harm, and the duty to promote just global institutions. Let us start with the duty to aid. How would I have to live to ensure that I only keep those resources for myself that generate benefits for me that are of comparable moral importance to the suffering of others that I could prevent by their alternative use? If I accept that the cost of saving others from deprivation is small compared to the cost of most of my daily enjoyments and needs, it would appear that the duty to aid would require me to completely change my life. I would have to devote my time, money, knowledge, and contacts to lessening the suffering of others, possibly to the point where I would be very badly off myself. This need not be the case, though: I would be permitted to keep what is necessary to sustain me in my good works, or even amass a huge fortune if this would eventually enable me to do more good. Warren Buffett, the world’s second-richest man, was asked to explain his decision to give away his billions to the cause of fighting global poverty and disease late in life, when he had given very little before. He replied: “I have always wanted to give my money away. But I was too good at making money. If I had given away my first $50,000 many decades ago, it would have done far less good. Better, I thought, to keep reinvesting it until I could really make a difference.” This duty to aid is, in sum, extremely demanding. Is its demandingness a sign that our conception of it is flawed? We may feel a pull to answer “yes” to this question that stems from nothing more than a desire to be free from the burden of guilt we would feel for acknowledging moral requirements that we suspect we will not meet. This pull should, of course, be resisted. Moreover, demandingness is itself not a sign that a duty is misconceived. After all, each of us recognises that respecting the duty not to kill an innocent stranger may be very demanding on occasion

(say, when the stranger is ahead of us on a waiting list for an urgently needed life-saving transplant organ). And we also recognise occasions, such as the pursuit of a just war, in which it may be our duty to sacrifice ourselves for some greater good. Nonetheless, legitimate questions have been raised about the way this duty to aid has been formulated. First, we face more than just a trade-off between the use of resources to further our personal projects on the one hand and the well-being of distant strangers on the other. For many people, a morally good life involves relationships with partners, family and friends. The demands of these relationships need to be weighed against the demands of the duty of assistance. Jonathan Glover explores this issue in his contribution to this forum (p49). Second, the way we have formulated the duty to aid does not consider two factors of moral importance: the causal process by which poverty has come about, and whether others are also in a position to help. Whether a person is remediably badly off due to his own wellinformed, uncoerced choices, for example, or whether he is in this situation due to bad brute luck, may make a difference to the strength of his claims on our aid. Furthermore, some person may be remediably badly off due to someone else’s action, or due to an action of our own, and this too may be important to the extent of our duties to him. Finally, whether I alone am in a position to relieve someone’s suffering, or whether others are in an equally good, or even better position, may make a difference to my duty to aid this person. In sum, questions about who is responsible for creating certain bad outcomes, and who is in a position to improve them, may be relevant to the extent of a person’s duty of assistance. David Miller addresses these issues in his article (p58). What of our duty not to harm others or participate in relationships which enable some agents to harm others through oppression and exploitation? Undoubtedly, a significant share of the economic transactions that the ordinary citizen of a rich country enters into on a daily basis are relationships of this kind. The taxes paid on shoes made in China support an oppressive communist dictatorship; the Kenyan green beans purchased in the supermarket are fed with irrigation water on which local fisher

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forum 47

poverty&thedutyofassistance

TP M

4th quarter 2006